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Abstract.  This paper reviews and generalizes a method to generate RSA
moduli with a predetermined portion. The potential advantages of the resulting
methods are discussed: both the storage and the computational requirements of
the RSA cryptosystem can be considerably reduced. The constructions are as ef-
ficient as generation of regular RSA moduli, and the resulting moduli do not
seem to offer less security than regular RSA moduli.
1   Introduction
In [18] Vanstone and Zuccherato presented several methods to generate RSA moduli
that contain a certain predetermined portion. They describe scenarios where such
moduli may be useful by reducing the storage requirements of RSA moduli without
compromising security. For instance, all members of a group of users may share some
fixed number of bits of their RSA moduli, or users may want to include a binary rep-
resentation of their personal data in their RSA modulus. For DSA keys with a prede-
termined portion see [13].
For an N-bit RSA modulus Vanstone and Zuccherato are able to specify up to N/2
leading bits. Their method for doing so is, however, quite inefficient. They also pres-
ent a faster method that allows specification of up to N/4 leading bits, and a compro-
mise scheme of intermediate speed that specifies between N/4 and N/2 leading bits.
All these methods are rather cumbersome and require factorization of the number
given by the specified leading bits. A more serious disadvantage of the leading bits
methods from [18] is that Coppersmith has shown in [12] that the resulting moduli are
substantially easier to factor than a general product of two large primes.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Vanstone/Zuccherato method is why they
chose such a complicated method and apparently overlooked the obvious and straight-
forward trick that is reviewed in this paper. Not only is it elementary, it also does not
seem to be affected by any known attack. This ‘follow your nose’ approach was
known to at least some people, among them Coppersmith (cf. [3]), Quisquater (cf.
[12]), and Shamir (cf. [16]), but most people, including the present author, were un-
aware of it. Allegedly (cf. [12]), it is used in a 1984 French banking standard. At-
tempts to access the reference [9] to this standard failed. Sakurai pointed out that the
method is described in [19] for a different application. Apparently, the trick was inde-
pendently reinvented many times, which is not so strange given how simple it is.
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The method presented in this paper allows generation of RSA moduli with any
number of predetermined leading bits, with the fraction of specified bits only limited
by security considerations. The basic method is as efficient as regular generation of
RSA moduli. Several generalizations are described as well: a slower version that al-
lows specification of slightly more bits, a method to specify any number of trailing
bits, and combined methods where the specified bits are split among the leading and
trailing bits of the modulus. In all methods ‘bits’ may be replaced by digits with re-
spect to any radix. The method to specify trailing bits is a simple modification of the
basic method. It was already described in [18] and is included for completeness.
Coppersmith’s attack does not affect any of the methods presented here (and there-
fore neither the security of the Vanstone/Zuccherato trailing bits method). Neither
does any other known attack seem to affect the security of the moduli as generated by
the methods presented here. Obviously that does not imply a proof of security. It can
be proved that for a randomly selected predetermined portion the resulting moduli
cannot be distinguished from regular RSA moduli. This is about the strongest security
result one may hope for in this context. Proving absolute security of the schemes
themselves is an entirely different matter. Such a proof is unlikely. Some confidence
in the strength of the methods may be provided by the fact that several eminent cryp-
tanalists have been aware of the basic method for many years without being able to
break it.
More or less the opposite approach to randomly selecting a predetermined portion
is to select it in such a way that the resulting moduli are relatively close to a power
of 2. According to [12] both Quisquater and the French banking standard focussed on
this particular application, because it allows entirely division-free and thus much faster
modular multiplication. Intuitively it sounds like a bad idea, but when a few straight-
forward precautions are taken no published factoring method can take substantial
advantage of the special form of the modulus. Both in the May 1998 draft of the forth-
coming ANSI X9.31 standard (cf. [1]) and in [17] it is mentioned that RSA moduli of
the form 264xc should not be used because they would be ‘readily susceptible’ to the
special version of the number field sieve integer factoring algorithm. Neither [1] nor
[17] specify how such moduli are generated, but if one of the methods presented in
this paper is used, then they are not vulnerable to such an attack.
The X9.31 standard contains a number of criteria to be satisfied by primes dividing
an RSA modulus. Some of these criteria make sense and can easily be satisfied, either
by construction or by rejecting the (sufficiently small) fraction of moduli that violate
one of the criteria. Other criteria are meant to protect against certain attacks but do, in
fact, not offer any additional protection and provide only a false and misleading sense
of security. Attempts to satisfy these latter criteria simply do not make sense, as ar-
gued in [15] as well. Therefore, the X9.31 criteria have not been incorporated in the
methods presented in this paper. It should be kept in mind, however, that incorporation
is possible and that in practical circumstances some of the criteria will have to be
taken into account.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic method and its generali-
zations are presented. Section 3 comments on the security of the proposed methods,
and in Section 4 RSA moduli that are relatively close to a power of 2 are discussed.
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2   Generating RSA Moduli with a Predetermined Portion
Throughout this section d ‡ Z>1 denotes a fixed radix. A digit refers to a digit in the
radix d representation. For a positive integer r its length |r| refers to the length of r’s
radix d representation with non-zero leading digit.
The length of the RSA modulus n to be constructed is denoted by N, the length of
the predetermined portion s of n is denoted by K with K < N, and L = N-K. The con-
catenation of two arrays of digits a1 and a0 is denoted a1||a0. In this section methods are
presented to construct RSA moduli with radix d representation s||r, r||s, and s1||r||s0,
where r is an array of L digits and s = s1||s0. Throughout this section it is assumed that
N, K, and L are sufficiently large.
(2.1) Fixing the leading digits of n. Let s be a number of length K. First compute the
number n' = s*dL of length N. Next, pick a random prime p of length at most L, round
n' up to the nearest multiple of p, and let q’ be the integer such that n' = p*q'. Finally,
find the smallest non-negative integer m such that q = q' + m is prime. If the resulting
n = p*q is of the form s||r, then return n, p, and q, and terminate; otherwise start all
over again with the same s.
Remarks. Note that [p*q'/dL] = s and that n = s||r, i.e., [n/dL] = [p*(q'+m)/dL] = s,
holds if p-1+m*p < dL (where the ‘p-1’ results from the rounding up). Because of the
Prime Number Theorem, m may on average be expected to be of order ln(N-|p|). It
follows that if p is chosen such that |p| is approximately equal to L-ln(K), then Algo-
rithm (2.1) may be expected to find an RSA modulus in time O(ln(L)+ln(K)):
O(ln(L)) steps to find a random p and O(ln(K)) to find q given q'. This is the same as
the expected time needed for regular generation of an RSA modulus of length N con-
sisting of the product of a length L and a length K prime.
If |p| is chosen closer to L (or, equivalently, if the length of s is chosen larger while
keeping |p| fixed) then Algorithm (2.1) may be expected to require more iterations
before it is successful. The largest |p| (or, equivalently, largest |s|) would require q' to
be prime, in which case Algorithm (2.1) may be expected to find an RSA modulus in
time O(ln(L)*ln(K)). This is of course substantially slower than regular RSA modulus
generation, but maximizes the length of the predetermined portion as N-|p|.
If L-|p| is chosen larger, then q can be chosen at random from among the primes in
a much wider range above q’. Obviously, for random s, this makes q much closer to a
random prime than is the case in Algorithm (2.1).
The number n' may also be defined as s*dL+dL-1, rounded down instead of up, af-
ter which the smallest non-negative m such that q'-m is prime should be determined.
Or the last L digits of n' may be randomized in either version. Also, truly random
digits may be appended to s, or p may be the product of several (sufficiently large)
primes. Or any of numerous other minor modifications may be applied to Algorithm
(2.1). Note that Algorithm (2.1) does not impose any size restrictions on p and q in
addition to the standard size restrictions for factors of RSA moduli.
4         A.K. Lenstra
A similar straightforward construction can be used to fix the trailing digits of n. In-
stead of dividing the (shifted) pattern by a random prime and appropriately changing
the trailing digits, the pattern may be divided by a random prime modulo a power of
the radix, after which the leading digits are changed appropriately. The resulting
method is identical to the method in Section 7 of [18]:
(2.2) Fixing the trailing digits of n. Let s be an array of K digits that corresponds to
an odd number (where s may have leading digits zero). First pick a random prime p of
length at most L, and a random number x of length L-|p|. Next, let q’ = x*dK + ((s/p)
mod dK) and let n’ = p*q’. Finally, find the smallest non-negative integer m such that q’
+ m*dK is prime, and let q be q’ + m*dK. If the resulting n = p*q has length N, then
return n, p, and q, and terminate; otherwise start all over again with the same s.
Remarks. The inverse of p modulo dK exists since p is prime and d may be assumed to
be much smaller than p. Furthermore, |n’|   K+L-|p|+|p| = N and n mod dK = p*(q’+
m*dK) mod dK = p*(x*dK + ((s/p) mod dK)) mod dK = s mod dK = s. The resulting n has
length at most N as long as m is not too large. Combined with the fact that the Prime
Number Theorem also holds in arithmetic progressions it follows that the run time
analysis of Algorithm (2.2) is similar to the run time analysis of Algorithm (2.1). Also,
more or less the same modifications can be applied.
Algorithms (2.1) and (2.2) can be combined into at least two different methods to
predetermine leading and trailing portions of the digits of an RSA modulus. The con-
ceptual ideas of the two methods are presented below. Let s = s1||s0 with |s1| = K1, |s0| =
K0, K = K1+K0, s0 odd if K0 > 0, and assume that N   2K. The constructions immedi-
ately generalize to any N > 2K. In general N < 2K cannot be achieved, i.e., at most
half the bits of the resulting modulus can be predetermined.
(2.3) Fixing the leading and trailing digits of n. Pick a random prime p of length K,
and write p = p1||p0 with |p1| = K1 and |p0| = K0. As in Algorithm (2.1) divide s1 by p1 to
get q1, the leading K1 digits of q. As in Algorithm (2.2) divide s0 by p0 modulo dK0 to get
q0, the trailing K0 digits of q. Let q’ = q1||q0. Find the smallest non-negative integer m
such that q’+m*dK0 is prime, and let q = q’+m*dK0.
(2.4) Alternative (slow) method of fixing the leading and trailing digits of n. Pick a
number p1 at random with |p1| = K1, the leading K1 digits of p. As in Algorithm (2.1)
divide s1 by p1 to get q1, the leading K1 digits of q. Pick an array q0 of K0 random digits,
the trailing K0 digits of q. As in Algorithm (2.2) divide s0 by q0 modulo dK0  to get p0,
the trailing K0 digits of p. Iterate choice of q0 (or add 1 to q0 and adapt p0 accordingly)
until p = p1||p0 and q = q1||q0 are prime.
Remarks. In both (2.3) and (2.4) the resulting n = p*q has trailing K0 digits equal to s0
and leading K1 digits close to s1. The leading K1 digits can be made equal to s1 by in-
cluding breathing space after the K1-th but before the K0-th digit, similar to the con-
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struction explained in the analysis of Algorithm (2.1). The details can be filled in
easily.
Algorithm (2.3) runs in expected time O(ln(K)): p is selected first after which q
follows, as in Algorithms (2.1) and (2.2). In Algorithm (2.4) parts of p and q are se-
lected at random, after which the complementary parts follow. Because the primes are
constructed simultaneously Algorithm (2.4) runs in expected time O(ln(K)2). It is
unclear if the approach of spreading the randomness between the two factors as in
Algorithm (2.4) has any advantages compared to the more direct approach of Algo-
rithm (2.3). With K0 = 0 Algorithm (2.3) generalizes to Algorithm (2.1) with N   2K,
and with K1 = 0 Algorithm (2.3) generalizes to Algorithm (2.2) with N   2K.
The lengths of p and q do not have to be the same, as follows from the following
generalized version of Algorithm (2.3).
Pick a random prime p of length L (L = N-K), and write p = p1||p0 with |p1| = L1
and |p0| = L0. As in Algorithm (2.1) divide s1dL1 by p1 to get q1, the leading K1
digits of q. As in Algorithm (2.2) divide s0 by p0 modulo dK0 to get q0, the trailing
K0 digits of q. Let q = q1||q0. Keep adding dK0  to q until q is prime.
A similar change applies to Algorithm (2.4). In both generalizations at most half the
bits of the resulting modulus can in general be predetermined.
3   Security Considerations
During regular generation of RSA moduli two primes, say p and q, are randomly and
independently selected, and their product, say n, is made public. Despite the independ-
ence of p and q, however, the prime q is determined by p and a complementary portion
of only [logd(n)-logd(p)] leading and/or trailing radix d digits of n, for any d > 1. In
Algorithms (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) the prime factor q is, by construction, determined by
the choice of p and the predetermined portion s of complementary length. It follows
that this situation is identical to regular RSA moduli, as long as the complementary
portion s of the modulus is randomly selected and as long as only m = 0 is allowed in
Algorithms (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3). (Instead of requiring m = 0, a much larger range of
m’s may be allowed than in Algorithms (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), to deal with the ‘unfair’
advantage of primes ending a long arithmetic progression of composites. Note, how-
ever, that many efficient prime generation methods used in RSA moduli generation
have the same bias.) A slightly more involved argument applies if portions of p and q
are randomly selected (and s is random), as in Algorithm (2.4). Thus, if the predeter-
mined portion is randomly selected then the moduli as constructed by the proper
variations of the methods from Section 2 cannot be distinguished from regular RSA
moduli. A similar argument appeared in [19].
Even if the predetermined portion is not randomly selected it is in general unclear
how to distinguish any particular modulus constructed as in Section 2 from a regular
RSA modulus. A predetermined portion that looks random to an unsuspecting outsider
may consist of some contrived encoding of useful information, such as a key merged
with a block cipher encryption using that key. An insider who knows the encoding
scheme for the predetermined portion has an advantage if no precautions are taken to
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hide the length of the factors. How this advantage may be used to factor the modulus
is unclear, as long as none of the factors is chosen too small and p does not depend on
the predetermined portion (as in [19]). Hiding the length of the factors may for in-
stance be done by adding truly random bits to the predetermined portion s, as men-
tioned in Section 2, or by forcing m as in Section 2 to be such that s gets extended, a
modification not explicitly mentioned in Section 2.
Once a predetermined portion has been recognized, for instance because it is shared
by many moduli, it is hard to imagine how it would help to factor any of them, since
anyone can generate such moduli. Furthermore, it is very unlikely that the security of a
regular RSA modulus is affected by using one of the algorithms from Section 2 to
generate a modulus having a large portion in common with it. Note that shared leading
digits can easily be recognized, mostly irrespective of the d used during construction
and the radix used for representation of the moduli. A common trailing portion may be
harder to recognize if different radices are used during construction and representa-
tion. One very minor problem with a shared portion is that there is a larger probability
that two participants end up with the same modulus, but this probability is of the same
order of magnitude that someone guesses one of the factors of an RSA modulus, and
may thus be neglected.
Predetermined portions that lead to special computational properties of the resulting
moduli are discussed in the next section.
4   Moduli of a Special Form
Algorithm (2.1) can be used to generate RSA moduli of the form dNt for positive t’s
that are substantially smaller than dN. On computers where numbers are internally
represented using radix d numbers, arithmetic operations modulo such RSA moduli
can be carried out very efficiently because divisions can entirely be avoided. Let the
radix d representation of t have N/c digits for some c > 1. Then reduction modulo dNt
of a product of approximately 2N radix d digits can be done in approximately N/(N-
N/c) multiplications of two numbers of N-N/c and N/c radix d digits, plus some addi-
tions. In standard arithmetic this amounts to approximately N2/c multiplications, which
is c times faster than ordinary or Montgomery reduction (cf. [10]) modulo numbers of
the same size. Moreover, ordinary reduction requires on the order of N low level divi-
sions. The above division-free reduction can be expected to make modular exponen-
tiation approximately 5c/(2c+3) times faster, a speed-up that can be increased by using
Karatsuba multiplication during the reduction process.
Algorithms (2.3) or (2.4) or their generalizations can be used to generate RSA
moduli of the form dNtdM1 with M < N/2 and |t|   N/2. As above, reduction modulo
dNtdM 1 of a product of approximately 2N radix d digits can be done in approxi-
mately N2/2 multiplications. Algorithm (2.2) can be used to generate N-digit RSA
moduli of the form tdM1. It is easy to see that such moduli lead to similar speed-ups,
not only when using standard arithmetic but also when Montgomery arithmetic (cf.
[10]) is used.
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It is suggested in [1] and [17] that such special form moduli are easier to factor than
regular RSA moduli. If that is indeed the case, then using them cannot be recom-
mended. Below some characteristics of the currently known factoring algorithms are
discussed and how their speed may be affected by factoring the above N-digit special
composites as opposed to regular RSA moduli having N radix d digits. Without loss of
generality it is assumed that d = 2 and that regular 1024-bit RSA moduli may be con-
sidered to be sufficiently secure against factoring attacks. The question addressed is
how small t may be chosen so that the factorization of 21024t does not become sub-
stantially easier than the factorization of a regular 1024-bit RSA modulus.
Elliptic curve method. The elliptic curve method (cf. [8]) is good at finding small
factors, with only polynomial dependence on the size of the number being factored.
Given ample practical experience with this method it may safely be assumed that
21024t cannot be factored by the elliptic curve method as long as the smallest factor is
at least 2300, even if the implementation takes advantage of the special arithmetic prop-
erties of the number 21024t being factored. Because in Algorithm (2.1) the size of t
corresponds to the size of one of the factors it follows that t should be at least 2300 and
at most 2724.
Other special purpose methods. With a smallest prime factor that is already at least
2300 it may safely be assumed that 21024t is secure against trial division and Pollard’s
rho method, and may be expected to be secure against Pollard’s p-1 method and
variations thereof (cf. [6]). Since the size of t corresponds to the size of the factor p
that is randomly selected at the beginning of Algorithm (2.1), explicit protection
against the latter methods may even be included (despite [15] and the author’s reser-
vations about such protections).
Number field sieve. If 21024t can be written as f(m) for an integer m and integral
polynomial f of reasonably low degree d, say between 3 and 10, and with coefficients
substantially smaller than the d-th or (d+1)-st root of n, then the number field sieve
(cf. [7]) runs substantially faster than for general 1024-bit numbers. Actually, if the
coefficients are bounded by constants the much faster ‘special’ number field sieve
applies. Note that all coefficients need to be small to get a substantial speed-up – as
long as even one of them is close to the d-th or (d+1)-st root of n hardly any speed-up
will be obtained. For 21024t with a t that may be expected to behave as a random num-
ber of at least 300 bits the probability is negligible that such a polynomial f with un-
usually small coefficients exists. Thus the number field sieve cannot be expected to
factor numbers of the form 21024t (as generated by Algorithm (2.1)) faster than regular
1024-bit RSA moduli, if the number 21024t is already properly protected against the
elliptic curve method.
Quadratic sieve. In the quadratic sieve factoring method (cf. [14]) one attempts to
find many smooth numbers close to the square root of the number being factored,
where a number is smooth when all its prime factors are smaller than some specified
bound. Given the way the numbers that are inspected for smoothness are generated,
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their size or smoothness probability is not affected by the special form of 21024t. Thus
quadratic sieve cannot be expected to factor numbers of the form 21024t faster than
regular 1024-bit RSA moduli.
Continued fraction method. The continued fraction method (cf. [11]) uses the con-
tinued fraction expansion of the squareroot of the number n being factored to generate
numbers that are inspected for smoothness. In general these numbers are at most 2»n.
The recursion used to generate them does not produce numbers of significantly differ-
ent size if n is of the form 21024t. The continued fraction method can therefore not be
expected to be able to take advantage of the special form of 21024t.
Cubic sieve. If integers a, b, c, can be found such that b3  a2c and b3  a2c modulo
21024t (or if a similar identity holds), then 21024t can be factored by means of the cubic
sieve (cf. [4]) in approximately the same time it would take quadratic sieve to factor a
general number of the same order of magnitude as (max(a,b,c))2. Thus, the identity
2*(2341)3  t modulo 21024t may make it possible to factor 21024t in the same time it
would take quadratic sieve to factor a number of order max(2682,t2), assuming that t is
square-free. It should be noted that this estimate is probably rather optimistic as far as
the speed of the cubic sieve is concerned, because computational experience with the
cubic sieve is very limited. For a conservative estimate of the security of 21024t this
optimism is justifiable.
The number field sieve factorization of a number   10130 could have been com-
pleted in one fifth of the time of the quadratic sieve factorization of a number   10129
(cf. [5]). Combining this conservative estimate with the asymptotic run times of the
number field sieve and quadratic sieve, it follows that a 780-bit number offers ap-
proximately the same amount of security against a quadratic sieve attack as a 1024-bit
number offers against a number field sieve attack. Thus, for square-free t, the security
of 21024t is not affected by the cubic sieve if max(2682,t2)   2780. It follows that t should
be of the form a2t’ where t’ has at least approximately 390 bits and is square-free. This
condition either can be satisfied by factoring (and possibly rejecting) a 390-bit t as
found by Algorithm (2.1), a rather impractical and cumbersome process, or it may
safely be assumed to hold on probabilistic grounds by using a larger t of, say, 500 bits.
Zhang’s method. If 21024t can be written as m3+c2m
2
+c1m+c0, then the method from
[20] factors 21024t in approximately the same time it would take quadratic sieve to
factor a general number of the same order of magnitude as 2682*max0≤i≤2ci. Because
vulnerability to this method implies vulnerability to the number field sieve, no speed-
up can be expected if the number 21024t is already properly protected against the ellip-
tic curve method.
Other general purpose factoring methods. There do not seem to be any special
properties of any other published general purpose factoring algorithms, such as
Dixon’s random squares method or the various methods using class groups, that may
affect the security of numbers of the form 21024t with, say, 2500 < t < 2700 as constructed
by Algorithm (2.1).
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Conclusion. It follows from the above brief factoring survey that numbers of the form
21024t as constructed by Algorithm (2.1) offer regular 1024-bit RSA security, as long
as t is not much smaller than 2500, and that square-free t’s as small as 400 bits may
even be used. Furthermore, t should not be much bigger than 2700. Thus RSA opera-
tions could be made at least 30% faster (using the analysis presented above with c =
2), while at the same time considerably simplifying the division code and saving stor-
age space for RSA moduli. These are a rather minor advantages compared to the
enormous disadvantage of a security breach when the above conclusion happens to be
incorrect.
After some straightforward modifications the same factoring analysis (and thus the
same conclusion) applies to the special form moduli generated using Algorithms (2.2),
(2.3), or (2.4).
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